Obligations Outside Ourselves

Obligations Outside Ourselves
In the pursuit of defining that which is moral, and that which brings about morality within man, a great many thinkers have grappled with this question, seldom agreeing. Some espouse principles like those found within western religion, while others it seems try to distance themselves as far as possible away from that line of thinking. Despite the myriad array of varying opinions, there does seem to be some focal points common to the greater collective of moral thought, one being the concept of obligation. In this essay, it is my intention to look first at George Mavrodes’ interpretation of moral obligation, followed by his theories’ antithesis. It is my belief that if we look closely at what philosopher Kai Nielsen has to say regarding morality, we will arrive at a line of thinking opposite that of Mavrodes.

In his essay Religion and the Queerness of Morality, Mavrodes explores why he believes morality without religion would be a “queer” or “absurd” concept. His primary focus in accomplishing the delivery of his position is juxtaposing religious and secular moralities. By attacking Bertrand Russell’s view of a godless universe, Mavrodes lays down the foundation of his argument that moral obligation is the basis for human morality. His assertions on this matter are three-fold. Foremost he tells us ‘morality includes, or results in, judgments of the form “N ought to do (or to avoid doing) ______” or “It is N’s duty to do (or avoid doing) ______”’(586). Mavrodes is telling us that we make moral decisions based on what we feel compelled, even implored to do. He accompanies this notion with what he refers to as “final obligations” or as he puts it; ‘It identifies the action that, if not done, will properly subject the person to the special adverse judgment’ (586). With this statement, Mavrodes is linking his theory, in part, to the ancient concept of consequence. Finally, the third component of his blueprint; ’it is, I think, a striking component of moral obligations that a person’s unwillingness to fulfill the obligation is irrelevant to having the obligation’ (587). This final piece of the puzzle is a very telling element of Mavrodes’ position. He is showing us that he believes there exists ultimate or undeniable responsibilities for human morality, and this is his segue into religious morality and the unquestionable moral instruction it provides. Given that this form of moral edict belies debate on the part of the follower, Mavrodes reasons that it works towards erasing the absurdity of a morality absent of god construct.

In his attempt to convince us that morality cannot exist in the absence of religion, Mavrodes explicitly details the “Russellian world,” noting that in Bertrand Russell’s scenario, there will inevitably be situations in which an individual choosing to act morally will result in a loss of that individual‘s overall happiness. In other words, Mavrodes thinks that there are situations in which a person acting morally in a “Russellian world” will suffer consequences for choosing to be moral, or acting upon their ethical code. Furthermore he states that in a “Russellian world,” there is no end reward to justify a person choosing to subject themselves to the suffering that will inevitably derive from their conscious decision to “do the right thing.” Mavrodes therefore concludes that this train of thought, when applied to morality, is ‘absurd.’ Not only does this position prevent the individual from having any freedom of personal choice in regards to their actions; (with one always feeling obligated by consequence / reward delivered via a higher power‘s threat of compunction), but additionally it serves to further a view held by many that this life is something we ought to suffer through, allowing ourselves little if any pleasure, because the true reward is waiting for us in the afterlife. A view starkly in contrast with Russell’s assertion that we only live once and we had better enjoy it while we can.

While Mavrodes offers us a glimpse of what the religious man might consider when pondering the question “why am I moral,“ a fitting counterweight to his proposal can be seen in Kai Nielsen’s Ethics Without God, written 20 years prior to Mavrodes argument, yet bearing an uncanny anticipation of its coming. In it, Nielsen calls attention to several inherent components of the religious man’s argument, when confronting secular moralists. To begin, Nielsen explains that the religious man looks upon the secularist as having no ultimately over-riding purpose for being good, or rather, good for goodness sake. Harkening back to words spoken by the lantern wielding “Madman” in Nietzsche’s The Transvaluation of Values when the Madman declares ‘God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves,’ (Nietzsche 156). It is much easier for a religious man to label the secularist “mad,” than to actually confront his relevant and logical arguments. Believing that the absence of a God creates a void in the fabric of morality, the religious man uses this notion to refute the very possibility of there ever being a reason to be moral, within a godless vacuum. Yet, as Nielsen tells us: ‘A man who says, “If God is dead, nothing matters,” is a spoilt child who has never looked at his fellow men with compassion’ (595).

Secondly, the religious moralist believes that human happiness, while being a good thing in and of itself, will undoubtedly lead to some form of egoism. Reproducing the religious critic’s argument here, Nielsen illustrates; ‘An individual who recognized the value of happiness -- might, if he were free of religious restraints, ask himself why he should be concerned with the happiness and self-awareness of others,’ (595). Morality, holding respect for others as an indigenous quality, would therefore be “queer or absurd” if the world was full of rational egoists. So it goes that the religious man asserts that ‘he alone can justify adherence to the principle’ (Nielsen 596) of respect for others. The religious moralist believes that the secularist is merely drawing his concept of respect for his fellow human from older teachings, empirically linked to organized religion, and that any semblance to secular morality is but a parasitic reflection of it’s parental religious roots.

So what does constitute man’s reason for being moral, if it is not based on religious obligation? Nielsen argues that it is based on community and a need that we experience for one another. He points out that as far back as we can recall, we know that man has been a social animal. Deriving our strength from unity, we flourish through community and complex social structures. ‘The very concept of community implies binding principles and regulations -- duties, obligations and rights’ (Nielsen 596). Here we see a point at which Mavrodes’ and Nielsen’s logic respectively cross over, with the nexus being: obligation. The difference is that while Mavrodes and the religious man contend that our moral obligation is based on the god-threat, Nielsen is explaining that our moral obligation exists as a product of human need. Our species needs to be happy, and this happiness revolves around our interaction with each other. We all know this to be true, and need look no further than within to find the answer. We all know what it feels like to need the help of another. We know that the best way to have someone help us, is to in turn be helpful individuals. The reciprocating nature of human coexistence creates the very foundation of secular morality. For this reason we do not need promises of an eternal reward, or threat of consequence dangled in front of us as if we are beleaguered beasts of burden. We all simply want to be happy right now at this very moment, and the best, most successful means by which to achieve that end throughout history has been our ability to identify the need to be decent to one another. To borrow a phrase from Nielsen, albeit out of context ‘it does not require a crucifixion of intellect’ (Nielsen 596)… to understand this concept.

Given the basic logic that secular morality supplies, it becomes apparent that what is truly “queer” and “absurd” is the notion that the existence of morality should be dependant on a brand of mysticism that remains an unproven mythology. In this light, we can even take it a step further and state that within the basic premises of secular morality, there exists another layer to the onion, as represented through Nietzsche’s concept of “The Will to Power.” Otherwise referred to as “Master Morality.” Beyond the apparent necessity for being decent towards one another that reason endows us with, there dwells the potential within us all to forge our own set of rules. Rather than seeing life as a despicable journey that we must somehow suffer through laboriously, we ought to embrace it for what it is. Elevate yourself to an untouchable level of blessedly exquisite thought and action, and all that is around you will be touched by this positive energy. Like the samurai, honor your enemy, for it is through this respect that the mentally aristocratic man arrives at a state of non-resentment. While moral obligation does exist, it is not dependent on the presence of a religion or a god. It survives due to the human condition of us needing each other. But apart from that, by learning to love our enemy, we learn to love ourselves, and this is the seed that when planted, blossoms into secular morality.

Tags: Bertrand Russell, George Mavrodes, Kai Nielsen, Master morality, Morality, Nietzsche, obligation, religion, religious secularist

Those Who Walk Away From America

Just finished this. If you have read the story, it may be interesting. Warning, this content is lost on the patriot. For ease of distinction, I am going to italicize LeGuin's words.

Walking Away From America
We are all familiar with routine. Each day we go about our daily rituals giving little thought to the how’s and why’s behind their existence. Suffice it to say, for many of us so long as our wants and needs are fulfilled, we are content to live out our lives conscious only of that small sphere of reality we call self. Oblivious to the actual mechanics of our personal realities, many of us embrace the notion that ignorance is bliss. In her short story "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas," Ursula K. LeGuin presents a fascinating glimpse at a group of townsfolk, and the terrible choice they are each required to make in order to ensure their continued happiness. Similar to the citizens of Omelas, there comes a time in the life of every American that we are confronted with the truth behind the illusion of our mutual prosperity. When faced with this difficult reality, like the people of Omelas, we have a choice.

Imagine a society that resembles as close an approximation of paradise as your mind will allow, and you will arrive at a place like Omelas. In LeGuin’s depiction of this utopia, she invites us to do just that; ‘I wish I could convince you. Omelas sounds in my words like a city in a fairy tale, long ago and far away, once upon a time. Perhaps it would be best if you imagined it as your own fancy bids’ (950). So it follows that the people of Omelas were happy folk, as would certainly be the case of people living in a veritable paradise. Although theirs’ was no mindless or flighty joy but rather they; ‘ -- do not say the words of cheer much anymore. All smiles have become archaic. -- They were mature, intelligent, passionate adults whose lives were not wretched’ (950). Yet something is wrong amidst the people of Omelas, something dank and simmering under the surface, as archaic as the smiles they exchange with one another.

You see there is a child locked de